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COMMENT 
THE ABSENCE OF MALICE? IN RE 
CHRISTIAN S., THE SECOND WIND OF THE 
IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 1978, Dan White received a sentence of 
less than eight years for the shooting deaths of San Francisco 
Mayor George Moscone and San Francisco Supervisor Harvey 
Milk.l The prosecution had sought the death penalty.2 A six 
hour riot on the steps of San Francisco's city hall followed.3 
The riot caused over $1,000,000 of damage to public buildings, 
incinerated twelve police cars, and injured 119 people, includ-
ing 59 police officers.4 White's diminished capacity defense, 
termed the "Twinkie Defense,',5 caused considerable controver-
1. People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1981). 
2. Melinda Beck, Night of Gay Rage, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1979, at 30. 
3.Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. The media had dubbed White's diminished capacity defense "The 
Twinkie Defense" because it was grounded in psychological testimony tending to 
show that Dan White's junk food diet aggravated a chemical imbalance in his 
brain, and he was therefore not legally responsible for his actions. Id. Though the 
record is not clear, apparently Dan White consumed an inordinate amount of 
twinkies on the day he shot Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk. 
Id. Psychological testimony focused on the combined effect of White's blood sugar 
level and a pre·existing mild mental disorder (depression). Id. The defense sought 
to show that due to a high consumption of sugar, Dan White's mental disorder 
was temporarily magnified, and Dan White was incapable of forming the mens rea 
of malice. Id. Because a finding of malice is a requirement for a murder convic-
tion, if the jury found that Dan White was incapable of forming malice at the 
time of the killing, the most serious offense he could be convicted of is the lesser 
included offense of voluntary manslaughter. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 615. 
297 
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sy.6 White's attorney, Douglas Schmidt, successfully used the 
diminished capacity doctrine to reduce two counts of first de-
gree murder, with the possibility of a death sentence or life 
imprisonment for each, to voluntary manslaughter.7 Though 
the trial judge sentenced White to the maximum term allow-
able by law, seven years and eight months, the judgment was, 
and still is, popularly considered a travesty of justice.s The 
California Legislature reacted by passing Senate Bill 54 in 
1981.9 
Senate Bill 54 amended several sections of the California 
Penal Code to prohibit the use of mental state defenses to 
defeat findings of malice. 1o Since 1981, California courts have 
held that the doctrines of diminished capacity, diminished 
responsibility, and irresistible impulse were successfully abol-
ished by Senate Bill 54. 11 The doctrine of imperfect self-de-
6. Beck, supra note 2, at 30. 
7. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 615 n.2. At the time, voluntary manslaughter 
carried a maximum sentence of four years. Id. It has since been raised to six 
years. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1995). 
8. Beck, supra note 2, at 30. 
9. UPI, Regional News, California, September 10, 1981, AM cycle, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. 
10. Id. 
11. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 575 (Cal. 1994) (Per Baxter, J., joined by 
Mosk, Kennard, Arabian, and George, JJ.; separate concurring opinion by Mosk, J. 
Dissent by Lucas, C.J., joined by Puglia, J.). 
The defenses of diminished responsibility and irresistible impulse are varia-
tions on the defense codified as Diminished Capacity in CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 
(West 1988). The full text of the statute is as follows: 
(a) The defense of diminished capacity is hereby 
abolished. In a criminal action, as well as any juvenile 
court proceeding, evidence concerning an accused person's 
intoxication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect 
shall not be admissible to show or negate capacity to 
form the particular purpose, intent, motive, malice afore-
thought, knowledge, or other mental state required for the 
commission of the crime charged. 
(b) In any criminal proceeding, including any juve-
nile court proceeding, in which a plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found 
by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was 
incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and 
quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from 
wrong at the time of the commission of the offense. 
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, evidence of di-
minished capacity or of a mental disorder may be consid-
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fense, which operates in much the same way as the above 
abrogated defenses, remained in a state of judicial limbo. 12 
Imperfect self-defense is a defense to a charge of murder 
whereby the defendant claims an actual, but unreasonable 
belief in the need to defend herself or to use deadly force. 13 
Because the court cannot find the required malice for a murder 
conviction, the defendant can only be convicted of manslaugh-
ter.14 Traditional self-defense, which would result in an ac-
quittal of the defendant,is not available because traditional 
self-defense requires that defendant's belief be reasonable. 15 
In In re Christian 8.,16 the California Supreme Court held 
that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense was not abolished by 
amendments made to the Penal Code in 1981.17 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court looked to the foundation of imperfect self-
defense in both common law and statutory law to see if the 
doctrine survived the amendments to the penal code. is The 
most significant amendment was the new definition of malice, 
which eliminated any review of the defendant's mental state, 
beyond determining that the act resulting in death was intend-
ed.19 The court reviewed the language of the statute, focusing 
ered by the court only at the time of sentencing or other 
disposition or commitment. 
(d) The provisions of this section shall not be 
amended by the legislature except by statute passed in 
each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-
thirds of the membership concurring, or by a statute that 
becomes effective only when approved by the electors. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West 1988). 
12. Id. at 574. 
13. Id. at 576. 
14. People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1979). 
15. Id. at 4. 
16. 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994). 
17. The Penal Code was amended by Senate Bill 54. The legislature amended 
the California Penal Code for the specific purpose of eliminating the diminished 
capacity defense, according to excerpts from legislative discussion and the majority 
opinion. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d at 577. The question remains as to whether 
these amendments also encompassed imperfect self-defense as well as diminished 
capacity. Specifically, it is the legislature'S amendment of Penal Code § 188, the 
definition of malice, that causes the most trouble. See infra note 19 for the text of 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 188. 
18. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d at 576. 
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 formerly read: 
Such malice may be express or implied. It is express 
3
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on the adverb "unlawfully" in the original definition of express 
malice aforethought, and held there was a sufficient basis to 
anchor imperfect self-defense.20 Concluding that the amend-
ment to Penal Code section 188 did not change the definitions 
of express and implied malice,21 the California Supreme Court 
held the doctrine of imperfect self-defense had survived the 
1981 amendments.22 
This comment will first discuss the background and devel-
opment of the imperfect self-defense doctrine. The comment 
will then examine the majority and dissent's analyses in In re 
Christian S. Finally, the comment will argue that contrary to 
the majority opinion, imperfect self-defense no longer has a 
viable foundation, and should no longer be recognized. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORY OF IMPERFECT SELF-
DEFENSE IN CALIFORNIA 
Imperfect self-defense operates to reduce a charge of homi-
cide to voluntary manslaughter.23 A murder conviction re-
quires the prosecution prove that a defendant acted with mal-
ice24 as defined in California Penal Code section 188.25 Im-
when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully 
to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied 
when no considerable provocation appears, or when the 
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned 
and malignant heart. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
The 1981 amendments to Penal Code § 188 added the second paragraph: 
When it is shown that the killing resulted from the inten-
tional doing of an act with express or implied malice as 
defined above, no other mental state need be shown to 
establish the mental state of malice aforethought. Neither 
an awareness of the obligation to act within the general 
body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such 
awareness is included within the definition of malice. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
20. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580. 
21. The definition, both before and after the 1981 amendment, requires the 
defendant to have a "deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a 
fellow creature." CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
22. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d at 583. 
23. People v. Flanne~ 603 P.2d at 2 (Cal. 1979). 
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988). 
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). See supra note 19 for the text of the 
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perfect self-defense defeats the finding of malice.26 The de-
fendant must act under "[a]n honest but unreasonable belief 
that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to 
life or great bodily injury .... "27 If the finder of fact deter-
mines that the defendant had an actual belie:fs in the need 
for self-defense, the defendant cannot be found to have acted 
with malice. This is true even if the defendant's belief is un-
reasonable.29 Because of the actual, though unreasonable, be-
lief in the need for self-defense, the defendant could not form 
the necessary mens rea for murder.30 The chargeable offense 
is reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter, which does 
not require the existence of malice.31 
Imperfect self-defense has been the subject of ample de-
bate since its acceptance as a general principle of law in People 
v. Flannel.32 Imperfect self-defense is used most often in con-
junction with claims that the victim battered or abused the 
defendant.33 Under these circumstances, the defendant, for 
reasons of safety or caution, often chooses to act at a time 
when her abuser is most vulnerable.34 Because, in these cir-
former and current statute. 
26. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 4. 
27. Id. 
28. The court in In re Christian S. changed the terminology from "an honest 
belief," used in Flannel, to that of "an actual belief" to avoid "the confusing sug-
gestion inherent in the phrase 'honest belief that a person could have a 'dishonest 
belief,' i.e., that a person could believe something he does not believe." In re 
Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 576 (Cal. 1994). 
29. As defined in CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 and prior case law. See, e.g., People 
v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1966). 
30. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 4. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 9. 
33. See, e.g., People v. Menendez, 279 Cal. Rptr. 521 (Ct. App. 1991). The 
most notable example is the much publicized trial of Erik and Lyle Menendez who 
shot and killed their parents as they watched television. Id. The Menendez broth· 
ers claim that an enduring pattern of abuse by their parents caused them to con-
tinually fear imminent death or great bodily injury. Id. The Menendezes argued 
that this created an actual, though objectively unreasonable, belief that deadly 
force was necessary to defend themselves at the time they shot their parents. Id. 
34. Gail Diane Cox, Abuse Excuse: Success Grows, THE NATIONAL LAw JOUR-
NAL, May 9, 1994, at A1. Paul Mones, a lawyer and author of When a Child Kills 
(PAUL MONES, WHEN A CHILD KILLS (1991)) (a book examining the phenomenon of 
parricide), explains in his book that after years of abuse, a defendant's survival 
instinct takes over and decides to eliminate the source of the defendant's pain, 
often when she is most likely to succeed, such as when the victim is sleeping or 
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cumstances, the defendant is in no actual danger or imminent 
peril, the defendant's belief in the need to act to defend herself 
would be unreasonable at the time of the killing. 35 
The imperfect self-defense doctrine produces a consider-
able legal dilemma. Should courts convict battered and abused 
defendants of murdering a person who consistently battered or 
abused them simply because they were not being attacked at 
that particular moment? Alternately, should courts reduce a 
homicide to voluntary manslaughter for a defendant that delib-
erately killed another person?36 The doctrine is supported by 
women's rights organizations and a variety of victim and de-
fendant rights groupS.37 Compounding this issue are the sub-
stantial problems involved in what amounts to prosecuting the 
deceased for abusing the defendant.36 
A. FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE 
The doctrine of imperfect self-defense was established in 
People v. Flannel. 39 The California Supreme Court ruled that 
imperfect self-defense was to be considered a general principle 
of law and courts were to instruct juries on the doctrine sua 
otherwise helpless. Cox, supra, at AI. 
35.Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Amici curiae for defendant in In re Christian S. were Orange County 
Women Lawyers Association, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, California Public 
Defenders' Association, Public Defender of Orange County, Office of the Public 
Defender of the City and County of San Francisco, and California Attorneys of 
Criminal Justice. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 582. 
38. Most defenses proffered by abused or battered defendants concentrate on 
the behavior of the deceased. The defense seeks to prove that the defendant was 
not responsible for her actions due to the cruelty of the deceased. Gail Diane Cox, 
Abuse Excuse: Success Grows, THE NATIONAL LAw JOURNAL, May 9, 1994, at AI. 
In re Christian S. differs from the typical abuse or battery cases that have histor· 
ically utilized imperfect self·defense. In In re Christian S. the reasonableness of 
the belief turned on the immanence of peril and the degree of the possible future 
injury (i.e., was the deceased likely to injure the defendant to a degree that would 
meet the death or great bodily injury standard of self·defense). The abuse and 
battery cases that use imperfect self·defense tum on the credibility of the witness' 
testimony regarding the deceased's abusive activities and psychological testimony 
regarding what effect this abuse has had upon the defendant. In re Christian S., 
therefore, is an excellent case for the court to examine the mechanics of imperfect 
self·defense, free of controversial facts or complicated psychological testimony. 
39. People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979). 
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sponte.4O The doctrine had previously been recognized in less 
definite forms in People v. Best,41 and later in People v. 
Wells. 42 It was subsequently applied to homicide in People v. 
Lewis.43 
Each of these cases focused on the nature of malice." The 
underlying principle relied upon by California courts is that 
"[t]he vice [of murder] is the element of malice; in its absence 
the level of guilt must decline."45 The doctrines of imperfect 
self-defense and diminished capacity arose from this princi-
ple.46 The California Supreme Court's opinion in Flannel re-
lied heavily on People v. Conley" for an analysis of malice.46 
40. [d. at 9. Sua sponte is defined as "[olf his or its own will or motion; vol-
untarily; without prompting or suggestion." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 
1990). 
41. People v. Best, 57 P.2d 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936). Best based his defense 
on self-defense. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on manslaughter, stat-
ing that manslaughter is included within murder. The California Court of Appeal 
found error, and held that the court must independently instruct on manslaughter 
when a manslaughter conviction is possible under a theory of an unreasonable 
belief. The California Court of Appeal in People v. Lewis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 263 at 270 
(Ct. App. 1960) (citing Best, 57 P.2d at 170) stated: 
[d. 
If the circumstances are both adequate to raise and suffi-
cient to justify, a belief in the necessity to take life in 
order to save oneself from such a danger, where the belief 
exists and is acted upon, the homicide is excusable upon 
a theory of self-defense . . . ; while, if the act is commit-
ted under the influence of uncontrollable fear of death or 
great bodily harm, caused by the circumstances, but with 
the presence of all the ingredients necessary to excuse the 
act on the ground of self-defense, the killing is man-
slaughter. 
42. People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1949). Wells was charged with a capital 
offense of assault on a police officer. The court of appeal held that if Wells held 
an honest but unreasonable fear of harm, malice would be negated, and Wells 
could not be convicted of murder. [d.· 
43. People v. Lewis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Ct. App. 1960). Lewis was the first 
opinion to apply the concept discussed in Wells to a defendant accused of murder. 
[d. 
44. Wells, 202 P.2d at 69. Wells stated "the critical question as to whether 
defendant's overt act was done with 'malice aforethought' . . . . " Flannel, 603 
P.2d at 6. Flannel stated "[tlhe nature of malice is central here .... " 
45. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 8. 
46. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 576. 
47. People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1966). At the tail end of a three day 
drinking binge, and while on medication for a back injury and an ulcer, Conley 
shot and killed Clifton and Elaine McCool. [d. Elaine McCool had "apparently" 
promised to divorce her husband and marry Conley. [d. Before leaving to shoot 
7
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Conley expanded the definition of express malice, the intention 
to unlawfully take away the life of another human being;9 to 
include the requirement that the defendant have "[a]n aware-
ness of the obligation to act within the body of laws regulating 
society."50 The Conley court, further stated that this aware-
ness "is included in the statutory definition of implied malice 
in terms of an abandoned and malignant heart and in the 
definition of express malice as the deliberate intention unlaw-
fully to take away life.,,51 The court concluded that if "the de-
fendant is unable to comprehend his duty to govern his actions 
in accord with the duty imposed by law, he does not act with 
malice aforethought and cannot be guilty of murder in the first 
degree."52 The Flannel court later used this language to justi-
fy imperfect self-defense.53 
In Flannel, the defendant shot and killed a man with 
whom he had a hostile and violent relationship.64 Both men 
had previously threatened each other's lives, and had been 
warned to avoid each other in a citation hearing stemming 
from a fight.56 Flannel shot the man when, in the process of 
staring each other down, the other man reached into his rear 
pocket where he was known to keep a knife.56 No one actually 
observed a knife in the victim's hand.67 At trial, Flannel relied 
on a theory of self-defense. 58 
the couple, Conley stated "I have been hurt by three different women before. 1 
can't take any more. She promised to marry me." Id. Despite stating on several 
occasions that· he was going to kill the McCools, Conley was never taken seriously 
by his friends, who thought he was raving just because he was drunk. Id. at 913-
14. 
48. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 6. 
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). See supra note 19 and accompanying 
text. 
50. Conley, 411 P.2d at 918. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 7. 
54. Id. at 3. 
55. Id. 
56.Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 4 ("The trial court instructed the jury on first and 
second degree murder, the role of malice for a murder and manslaughter, the 
effect of the sudden quarrel and heat of passion doctrines, and voluntary intoxica-
tion."). 
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In Flannel, the California Supreme Court connected im-
perfect self-defense with the malice definition in Conley: 
Given this understanding of malice afore-
thought, we cannot accept the People's claim 
that an honest belief, if unreasonably held, can 
be consistent with malice. No matter how the 
mistaken assessment is made, an individual 
cannot genuinely perceive the need to repel 
imminent peril or bodily injury and simulta-
neously be aware that society expects conformity 
to a different standard. Where the awareness of 
society's disapproval begins, an honest belief 
ends. It is an honest belief of immanent peril 
that negates malice in a case of complete self-de-
fense; the reasonableness of the belief simply 
goes to the justification for the killing. 59 
The court in Flannel thereby established that imperfect self-
defense applies when the defendant was unaware of the "obli-
gation to act within the general body of laws regulating soci-
ety."60 Consequently, in developing the imperfect self-defense 
doctrine, the Flannel court expressly adopted the interpreta-
tion of malice set forth in Conley. 61 
The statutory foundation for imperfect self-defense is the 
requirement of malice for a murder conviction.62 "[B]ecause 
malice is a statutory requirement for a murder conviction,63 
[Penal Code section 188] required courts to determine whether 
an actual but unreasonable belief in the imminent need for 
self-defense rose to the level of malice within the statutory 
definition. The doctrine thus had statutory as well as common 
law roots."64 
59. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 7. 
60. This exact text is found in both Conley, 411 P.2d at 918. and the amended 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). See supra note 19 for the text of the stat-
ute. 
61. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 7. 
62. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 576. 
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (a) (West 1988) (citations omitted). 
64. Christian S .• 872 P.2d at 576-77. 
9
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B. THE 1981 LEGISLATION (CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL 54) 
The relevant parts of the 1981 Legislation amended four 
sections of the penal code. These are Penal Code section 28, 
evidence of mental disease, mental defect or mental dis or-
der;65 Penal Code section 29, mental state; restriction on ex-
pert testimony; determination by trier of fact;66 Penal Code 
section 188, malice, express malice, and implied malice de-
fined;67 and Penal Code section 189, murder, degrees.66 
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 28 (West 1988). The full text of the statute reads as 
follows: 
Id. 
(a) Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or 
mental disorder shall not be admitted to show or negate 
the capacity to form any mental state, including, but not 
limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, 
deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the ac-
cused committed the act. Evidence of mental disease, 
mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible solely on 
the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a 
required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or har-
bored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is 
charged. 
(b) As a matter of public policy there shall be no 
defense of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, 
or irresistible impulse in a criminal action or juvenile 
adjudication hearing. 
(c) This section shall not be applicable to an insani-
ty hearing pursuant to Section 1026 or 1429.5. 
(d) Nothing in this section shall limit a court's 
discretion, pursuant to the Evidence Code, to exclude 
psychiatric or psychological evidence on whether the ac-
cused had a mental disease, mental defect, or mental 
disorder at the time of the alleged offense. 
66. CAL. PENAL CODE § 29 (West 1988). The full text of the statute reads as 
follows: 
Id. 
In the guilt phase of a criminal action, any expert testi-
mony about a defendant's mental illness, mental disorder 
or mental defect shall not testify as to whether the defen-
dant had or did not have the required mental states, 
which include, but are not limited to, purpose, intent, 
knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes charged. 
The question as to whether the defendant had or did not 
have the required mental states shall be decided by the 
trier of fact. 
67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). The full text of the statute reads as 
follows: 
Such malice may be express or implied. It is ex-
10
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There is no specific mention of imperfect self-defense anywhere 
in any of the four amended sections of the Penal Code. 
ld. 
press when there is manifested a deliberate intention 
unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is 
implied when no considerable provocation appears, or 
when the circumstances attending the killing show an 
abandoned and malignant heart. 
When it is shown that the killing resulted from the 
intentional dOing of an act with express or implied malice 
as defined above, no other mental state need be shown to 
establish the mental state of malice aforethought. Neither 
an awareness of the obligation to act within the general 
body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such 
awareness is included within the definition of malice. 
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1995). The full text of the statute 
reads as follows: 
ld. 
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a de· 
structive device or explosive, knowing use of ammunition 
designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, 
lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful. 
deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is commit· 
ted in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson 
rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, 
train wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 286, 
288, 288a, or 289, or any murder which is perpetrated by 
means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, 
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with 
the intent to inflict death, is murder of the first degree. 
All other kinds of murders are of the second degree. 
As used in this section, "destructive devicew means 
any destructive device as defined in Section 12301, and 
"explosivew means any explosive as defined in Section 
12000 of the Health and Safety Code. 
To prove the killing was "deliberate and premedi-
tated," it shall not be necessary to prove the defendant 
maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of 
his or her act. 
11
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Penal Code section 188 is most relevant to imperfect self-
defense.69 The definition of malice had previously read: 
Such Malice may be express or implied. It is 
express when there is manifested a deliberate 
intention unlawfully to take away the life of a 
fellow creature. It is implied, when no consid-
erable provocation appears, or when the circum-
stances attending the killing show an abandoned 
and malignant heart.70 
The amendment to Penal Code section 188 adds a second para-
graph to the definition of malice which reads: 
When it is shown that the killing resQ-Ited from 
the intentional doing of an act with express or 
implied malice as defined above, no other mental 
state need be shown to establish the mental 
state of malice aforethought. Neither an aware-
ness of the obligation to act within the general 
body of laws regulating society nor acting despite 
such awareness is included within the definition 
of malice. 71 
The legislative history of Senate Bill 54 gives insight to 
the motivation behind the passing of the bill. The 
Legislature's Joint Committee for the Revision of the Penal 
Code published a report which stated "[t]he recent [case] of 
Dan White72 in San Francisco ... brought to the public's at-
69. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580. Because imperfect self-defense is not depen-
dent on mental state, disease or defect, Penal Code sections 28 and 29 are not 
particularly relevant to imperfect self-defense. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 28-29. The 
legislature mentions specifically in CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(b) that "[als a matter of 
policy there shall be no defense of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, 
or irresistible impulse in a criminal action or juvenile acljudication hearing." [d. 
The amendment to Penal Code section 29 eliminates testimony "as to whether the 
defendant had or did not have the required mental states, which include, but are 
not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes 
charged." [d. The amendment to Penal Code section 189 eliminates the need "to 
prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his 
or her act." [d. This amended language in California Penal Code section 189 
tracks the common law test of voluntary intoxication, and has been interpreted to 
have been specifically directed at and limited to the elimination of voluntary intox-
ication. [d. 
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
71. [d. (emphasis added). 
72. See People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1981), 8upra note 5. 
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tention an area of long standing controversy, the defenses of 
diminished capacity and insanity in criminal prosecution .... 
[Senate Bill 54] would repeal the defenses of voluntary intoxi-
cation and diminished capacity."73 Another letter from the 
same committee to the Governor states "[t]he defenses of di-
minished capacity, diminished responsibility and irresistible 
impulse are repealed .... "74 In addition, the Governor's Legal 
Affairs Secretary stated that Senate Bill 54 "makes a number 
of substantive and procedural changes relative to the general 
issue of diminished capacity defenses ... [and is] an attempt 
to change the focus from the defendant's general capacity to 
form a given mental state to the ultimate question of whether 
the defendant in fact actually had the required mental 
state."75 The Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice report-
ed "[t]he purpose of this bill [including the 1981 amendments] 
is to eliminate the use of diminished capacity defenses; to 
eliminate psychiatric opinions on the ultimate issue of intent; 
and to reverse Supreme Court decisions that require certain 
cognitive requirements for first and second degree murder."76 
Imperfect self-defense is only alluded to in the Assembly 
Committee's report through the phrase "cognitive require-
ments."77 The ambiguity of the legislative history and the sim-
ilarities between imperfect self-defense and diminished capaci-
ty make it unclear whether the legislature intended to elimi-
nate imperfect self-defense.78 
Pioneer of the famous "Twinkie Defense," Dan White successfully mitigated his 
murder indictment to a manslaughter conviction after proving that by eating too 
many twinkies he raised his blood sugar to a point where he was no longer capa-
ble to form the required malice aforethought to be convicted of murder. Id. 
73. Joint Comm. for Revision of the Penal Code Rep. (Sept. 3, 1981) p. 1 
(1981-82 Reg. Sess.) (a California legislative committee to review prospective 
changes to the penal code). 
74. Letter from Joint Comm. for the Revision of the Penal Code to Governor's 
Deputy Legal Affairs Sect., Sept. 4, 1981. 
75. Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 54 by Governor's Legal Affairs Sec., p. 1-2. 
76. Assem. Comm. on Criminal Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill 54, June 30, 
1981, at p.3. 
77. Id. 
78. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 582. A bill relating to imperfect self-defense, 
Senate Bill No. 1144, Cal. Leg., 1993-94 Reg. Sess. [hereinafter SB 11441, was 
pending at the time In re Christian S. was decided. The court declined to consider 
why the legislature would introduce a bill to codify imperfect self-defense if they 
never intended to eliminate it in the first place. 
13
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C. PEOPLE V. SAILLE - THE CONLEY DEFINITION OF MALICE 
AFTER THE 1981 AMENDMENTS 
People v. Saille79 was a significant development in the 
relevant case law, and was addressed at some length by both 
the mejority and the dissent in In re Christian S. While Saille 
expressly refused to decide the question of how, or if, the 1981 
amendments effected the doctrine of imperfect self-defense,BO 
it did address and review the newly amended malice stat-
ute.81 
Saille was convicted of first degree murder and attempted 
murder.82 Saille was repeatedly denied entrance to a bar be-
cause he was noticeably drunk. sa He returned later in the 
night with a semi-automatic assault rifle and attempted to 
shoot the doorman.84 The doorman grabbed the rifle and in 
the ensuing struggle a bystander was shot and killed.85 Both 
Saille and the doorman were shot.86 In Saille, the California 
Supreme Court analyzed the new malice definition as follows: 
The first sentence ... limits malice to the defini-
tion set forth in section 188. This sentence clear-
ly provides that once the trier of fact finds a 
deliberate intention unlawfully to kill, no other 
mental state need be shown to establish malice 
aforethought. Whether a defendant acted with a 
wanton disregard for human life or with some 
antisocial motivation is no longer relevant to the 
issue of express malice. No doubt about this 
conclusion is possible when the last sentence of 
section 188 is analyzed. That sentence directly 
repudiates the expanded definition of malice 
79. People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588 (Cal. 1991). 
80. The SaUle court stated that imperfect self·defense "has no application to 
the facts before us, and we do not decide whether it has been affected by . . . the 
1981 legislation." SaUle, 820 P.2d at 590, n.1. 
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
82. SaUle, 820 P.2d at 590. 
83. Id. A blood sample taken from Saille two hours after the incident showed 
a blood alcohol level of .14 percent. Expert testimony at trial established that the 
level would have been about .19 percent at the time of the shooting. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
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aforethought in People v. Conley... that ex-
press and implied malice include an awareness 
of the obligation to act within the general body of 
laws regulating society and the capability of 
acting in accordance with such awareness. After 
this amendment of section J88, express malice 
and an intent unlawfully to kill are one and the 
same. 
Pursuant to the language of section 188, 
when an intentional killing is shown, malice 
aforethought is established.s7 
311 
Thus, in Saille, the California Supreme Court recognized that 
the amended version of California Penal Code section 188 
abrogated the findings in Conley that the definition of malice 
includes an awareness of the "obligation to act within the gen-
eral body of laws regulating society."88 
Additionally, the Saille court reviewed the amended defini-
tion of express malices9 and found that "[t]he adverb 
'unlawfully' in the express malice definition means simply that 
there is no justification, excuse, or mitigation for the killing 
recognized by the law."90 If a defendant intended to do an act 
which resulted in the victim's death, and it was later deter-
mined that the act was illegal, the court would find that the 
defendant harbored malice. Thus, the Supreme Court in Saille 
found that "unlawfully" modified the act of killing, and not the 
intent to kill.91 In re Christian S. marks the first time the 
court would consider directly whether imperfect self-defense 
was abrogated in 1981 along with diminished capacity, dimin-
ished responsibility, and irresistible impulse.92 
87. Saille, 820 P.2d at 594 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The last sen-
tence of section 188 reads: "Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within 
the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is 
included within the definition of malice." CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
88. People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911, 918 (Cal. 1966). 
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
90. Saille, 820 P.2d at 595 (citing People v. Stress, 252 Cal. Rptr. 913. 918 
(Ct. App. 1988». See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). supra note 19 for the 
text of the statute. 
91. Saille. 820 P.2d at 595. 
92. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 577. 
15
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III. IN RE CHRISTIAN S.: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
Christian S., a juvenile, was charged with second degree 
murder for shooting and killing Robert Elliot.93 Elliot was a 
"skinhead"94 and was closely associated with individuals who 
had violent "run-ins" with Christian S. since 1988.96 When the 
windshield of Elliot's new truck was smashed, Elliot publicly 
held Christian S. accountable, announcing his intentions to 
"beat him Up."96 Fearing attack, Christian S. kept a shotgun 
next to his bed during that summer.97 
Elliot and Christian S. later came to blows at a beach 
party.98 Elliot confronted Christian S. about the damage to his 
truck.99 Christian S. denied any wrong doing, but struck 
Elliot. loo Elliot fought back, and Christian S. ran away. 101 
Christian S.'s mother testified that, following this incident, 
Christian S. was terrified, convinced he was about to be killed, 
and wanted a gun.102 A friend and neighbor confirmed that 
Christian S. was fearful and agitated and that he said he need-
93. In re Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232 (Ct. App. 1993). 
94. Id. at 232. The appellate court states that skinheads "are easily identified 
by their distinctive dress, hair, tattoos, and swastikas." Id. Though the court de-
clines to mention it, skinheads are generally known as violent racists. See Jessica 
Crosby, Arrests Reportedly Foil White Supremacists' Plot Los Angeles Race War 
Planned, Offu;ials Say, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 16, 1993, at AS. Both the 
appellate court opinion and the supreme court opinion excluded any reference to 
Christian S. as a member of any race, religion or group that would be a likely 
target for stereotypical skinhead violence, though this may have been the motiva-
tion behind the antagonism between Elliot and Christian S. Though it has no 
bearing on the technical aspects of the California Supreme Court's opinion, seeing 
Christian S. as a young man retaliating against a campaign of racially motivated 
violence and harassment amplifies the possible policy considerations the supreme 
court may have focused on while writing their opinion. 
95. Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232. The court cites two examples of 
violence involving firearms directed against Christian S.; random shots fired into 
his bedroom and someone taking a shot at him while he was walking the beach. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. The court notes testimony that Christian S. boasted that he was vio-
lent and involved with a gang, but states that "Christian was clearly scared of 
Elliot, his friends, and their threats." Id. 
98. Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss2/3
1995] IMPERFECT SELF -DEFENSE 313 
ed more weapons. loa 
That weekend Christian S. attended another beach party. 
He showed a pistol to a friend and mentioned that he was 
scared of Elliot, but that he would use it "if the guy came down 
[to the beach] .... "104 Elliot and a friend arrived at the party 
later that night. l05 Christian S. pulled his pistol and he and 
Elliot stood face to face, shouting at each other.loo Christian 
S. told him, "Just get out of here - I don't want to shoot you; 
just go home."107 Elliot smiled as he retorted, "Go ahead and 
shoot me."I08 After some taunting by Elliot, Christian S. 
dropped his hand and stated he was going home. l09 
Instead of turning to go, Eliiot suddenly ran at Christian 
S. saying ''You're not going to get away from me this time, I'm 
going to get yoU."l1O Christian S. ran down the beach with 
Elliot in pursuit.ll1 Occasionally Christian S. turned to point 
his pistol at Elliot.l12 Elliot would stop, but then continued to 
pursue after Christian S. resumed running. 113 Eventually, 
Christian S. tired, stopped and again pointed his pistol at 
Elliot.114 While taking short steps toward Christian S., Elliot 
said "[y]ou pussy, come on, shoot me, you won't shoot me."115 
After kneeling in place for about fifteen seconds, Christian S. 
103. Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 232. Two of Elliot's friends showed up on 
the first day of school. [d. They followed Christian S. to his classroom and threat-
ened to beat him up after class. [d. Christian S. "cowered in a comer behind a 
teacher" until- they left. [d. The two were described by the court as tattooed, mus-
cular skinheads. [d. Christian S. asked a friend for an old pistol. [d. His friend 
who gave the pistol to him only after Christian S. insisted he did not "'want to 
shoot these people, but if they're endangering my life and it comes down to him 
or me,' he would shoot them." [d. 
104. Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234. 
105. [d. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. 
109. Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234. 
110. [d. 
111. [d. at 235. 
112. [d. 
113. [d. 
114. Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235. Apparently, Christian S.'s hands 
were shaking so much he had to drop to one knee to steady himself. [d. 
115. [d. 
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fired once, killing Elliot.u6 Christian S. later surrendered to 
a deputy sheriff at a gas station.117 At the gas station Chris-
tian S. told the deputy about having shot a man in self-de-
fense, and that he had not wanted to shoot him. U6 
At trial, defendant raised claims of self-defenseu9 and 
heat of passion or provocation,120 contending that because the 
doctrine of imperfect self-defense negated a showing of malice, 
the charge should be reduced to voluntary manslaughter. 121 
The trial court rejected all defenses and concluded defendant 
had committed a crime that, if committed by an adult, would 
constitute second degree murder. 122 The court made no for-
mal findings at the time of its ruling, but implicitly found 
inadequate provocation for voluntary manslaughter.123 It can-
not be determined from the record whether the trial court 
found that imperfect self-defense had been eliminated as a 
doctrine, or whether imperfect self-defense did not apply to the 
facts in In re Christian S.124 
Defendant nevertheless appealed, claiming the trial court 
erred in finding that imperfect self-defense was eliminated by 
Senate Bill 54.125 The California Court of Appeal reversed the 
trial court, 126 and found that the record established that 
when defendant fired the gun, he feared Elliot was about to 
seriously harm him.127 The court also concluded from the re-
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1988). 
120. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1995). 
121. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 575 (Cal. 1994). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 576. 
124. Id. According to the appellate opinion, Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232 
(1993), the trial court focused substantially on the physical distance between 
Christian S. and Elliot, and the relatively long time interval during which Chris-
tian S. aimed at Elliot before firing, and concluded he had sufficient time to care-
fully consider what he was doing. Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235. 
125. Christian S. 872 P.2d at 576. From the defendant's claim of error, it could 
be assumed that the court had impliedly found that imperfect self-defense was no 
longer a viable doctrine. 
126. In re Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232 (Ct. App. 1993). 
127. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 576. The court of appeal noted that whether 
Elliot stopped every time Christian S. pointed his gun at him is disputable. Id. 
Testimony from another observer that Elliot only slowed the second time Christian 
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cord that Christian S. had acted with a "honest belief' in the 
need to defend himself.128 The State asserted that the doc-
trine of imperfect self-defense was eliminated by amendments 
to the California Penal Code in 1981, and thus was not avail-
able as a defense.129 The court of appeal found that the Cali-
fornia Legislature had not abrogated the imperfect self-defense 
doctrine, and that defendant's honest belief in the need for 
self-defense negated a finding of malice.13o The California Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to rule on whether imperfect 
self-defense had been eliminated by the 1981 amendments to 
the penal code.l3l 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY 
In In re Christian S., the California Supreme Court in its 
majority opinion132 held that imperfect self-defense remains a 
valid doctrine. 133 The court further held that a finding of im-
perfect self-defense requires that the defendant have an actual 
belief in the need for self-defense.134 A risk of future harm, no 
matter how great, is insufficient to support Imperfect self-de-
S. pointed his gun at him. Id. The testimony of two witnesses directly conflict 
concerning whether Elliot even stopped at all the third, and last, time Christian 
S. pointed the gun at Elliot. Christian S., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235. 
128. Id. at 236. The Appellate Court opinion states that on appeal Christian S. 
contends that imperfect self-defense was established. It is unclear whether Chris-
tian S. argued this point at trial. 
129. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 576. 
130. 1d. 
131. Id. 
132. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 576 (Cal. 1994). Defendant also appealed 
the trial court's findings of inadequate provocation to support a heat of passion de-
fense and a refusal to allow expert testimony regarding the fight-or-flight syn-
drome. These appeals were not discussed by the California Court of Appeal or the 
California Supreme Court, as they are preempted by the finding that imperfect 
self-defense is a valid and applicable doctrine in this case. 
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Mosk, has little to do with im-
perfect self-defense. Justice Mosk concurs with the majority in all respects except 
the discussion concerning implied malice. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 584. The re-
mainder of the concurrence chastises the legislature for passing laws that are 
ambiguous, and has little to do with the issue at hand. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 
584-85. 
133. Id at 583. 
134. 1d. 
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fense. 135 Therefore, a trier of fact must find that the defen-
dant had an actual fear of imminent harm.136 The majority 
also cautioned that the doctrine is narrow.137 In rebuttal to 
the argument that this ruling will lead to "a proliferation of 
unfounded claims of self-defense"13s the court stated "[w]e 
leave that concern to the Legislature. "139 
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by trac-
ing the source of imperfect self-defense through the common 
law, and identifying its statutory foundation!40 The court 
next examined whether the 1981 amendments eliminated the 
foundations of imperfect self-defense when it eliminated dimin-
ished capacity. 141 The majority found that the common law 
basis of imperfect self-defense was specifically undermined 
because the legislature used the same language as used in 
Flannel in amending the malice statute.142 However, the ma-
jority concluded that the requirement to act "unlawfully" in the 
statutory malice definition143 sufficiently supports the doc-
trine of imperfect self-defense.144 The court held that "the 
Legislature has not, whether in the 1981 amendments to the 
Penal Code or otherwise, eliminated the doctrine of imperfect 
self-defense."145 The court reversed Christian S.'s conviction 
and remanded the case for a determination of whether Chris-
tian S. held an actual belief in the need for self-defense and for 
an instruction to the jury on imperfect self-defense consistent 
with their decision.146 
135. 1d. 
136. 1d. 
137. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 583. 
138. [d. 
139. [d. 
140. [d. at 576. 
141. 1d. at 578. 
142. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 579. 
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
144. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 581. 
145. 1d. at 583. 
146. [d. The mejority denies that public policy is a driving force behind their 
ruling. Public policy issues are "properly left to the legislature." Two sentences 
later, the court states that public policy is a "relevant, albeit secondary, consider-
ation for our decision in the present case." The court does not state what those 
policy considerations are. 
The court eventually concludes that there is no indication the Legislature 
discussed any of the policy issues raised by the amici curiae and the court hesi-
tates to change the existing law without debate or a clear resolution. [d. 
20
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1. The Foundations of Imperfect Self-defense 
The court determined that the common law roots of imper-
fect self-defense were found in Flannel,I47 where imperfect 
self-defense was first stated as a general principle of law. l48 
In Flannel the court observed that the doctrine of imperfect 
self-defense had been "obfuscated by infrequent reference and 
inadequate elucidation."149 Relying on prior case law, the 
Flannel court clearly stated that the doctrine of imperfect self-
defense is a device which mitigated murder to manslaugh-
ter.150 "An honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary 
to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily 
injury negates malice aforethought, the mental element neces-
sary for murder, so that the chargeable offense is reduced to 
manslaughter.,,151 As previously noted, Flannel relied heavily 
on Conley's definition of malice,152 requiring an "awareness of 
147. People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 1 (1979). It is important to note that Flan· 
nel was decided in 1979, two years before the legislation at issue. 
148. [d. at 7. 
149. [d. at 8. 
150. [d. at 7. 
15l. Flannel, 603 P.2d at 4. 
152. The prosecution argues that the doctrines of imperfect self-defense and 
diminished capacity are so closely related that it is impossible to eliminate one 
without eliminating the other (Christian S., 872 P.2d at 578). Though the two 
doctrines originated out of the same expansive definition of malice in Conley the 
court differentiated between the two doctrines based on an analysis of the prior 
case law. It found a great disparity in the development of the two doctrines. The 
majority concludes that the difference in common law ancestry distinguishes the 
two doctrines so that they could not be seen as legislatively inseparable (Christian 
S., 872 P.2d at 579). 
In addition the court cites Flannel stating that "[wle disagree that the doc-
trine of unreasonable belief is necessarily bound up with or limited by the con-
cepts of either heat of passion or diminished capacity." (Christian S., 782 P.2d at 
579 (citing Flannel, 603 P.2d at 5». "[Dlespite the discussion in Flannel of mental 
capacity, neither that opinion nor the other cases approving imperfect self-defense 
could have misled the Legislature into reasonably believing that the doctrine was 
the same as, or even inextricably bound up with, the diminished capacity defense." 
Christian S., 782 P.2d at 579. 
The majority concluded by arguing that the difference between diminished 
capacity and imperfect self-defense is obvious, and diminished capacity is specifi-
cally mentioned in the amendments and imperfect self-defense was not. Christian 
S., 872 P.2d at 579. Assuming the Legislature was aware of the difference in the 
doctrines, the court concludes that if the Legislature wanted to eliminate imperfect 
self-defense, they would have specifically stated so. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 579. 
The majority cited First M.E. Church v. Los Angeles Co., 267 P. 703 (Cal. 1928), 
refusing to legislate by presuming what the Legislature intended, and refuses to 
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the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating 
society."163 
To clarify the foundation of imperfect self-defense, the In· 
re Christian S. court looked to People v. De Leon. 164 In De Le-
on, the California Court of Appeal found that imperfect self-de-
fense had common law roots in addition to the statutory foun-
dation of the requirement of malice for a murder convic-
tion:166 
[A]lthough ... Flannel relied upon the expanded 
mental component of malice in formulating its 
imperfect self-defense doctrine, its reliance was 
only partial. Independent of this expanded men-
tal component and independent of diminished 
capacity, Flannel regarded imperfect self-defense 
as a factor which - just like "the statutorily [sic] 
suggested 'sudden quarrel or heat of passion' -
can negate malice aforethought . , .. "156 
The majority in In re Christian S. concluded that the court 
in De Leon correctly observed that the decision in Flannel was 
based on two independent premises: (1) the notion of mental 
capacity set forth in Conley, and (2) a grounding in the statuto-
ry requirement of malice.157 The majority in In re Christian 
S. looks to both these foundations to determine if imperfect 
self-defense is viable.158 
2. The Effect of the 1981 Amendments on the De Leon 
Foundations of Imperfect Self-defense 
The California Supreme Court found that the amended 
language in the new malice definition 159 removed the require-
imply that the Legislature intended to include imperfect self-defense in the 1981 
amendments. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 578. 
153. Conley, 411 P.2d at 918. 
154. 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825 (Ct. App. 1992). 
155. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 576. 
156. De Leon, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829 (emphasis in original)(citation omitted). 
157. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 579 (relying on People v. De Leon, 12 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 825 (Ct. App. 1992) and People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979». 
158. ld. 
159. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). See supra note 19 and accompanying 
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ment that a defendant be aware of "the obligation to act within 
the general body of laws regulating society."l60 This is the no-
tion of mental capacity set forth in Conley and used in Flannel, 
and the first foundational pillar of imperfect self-defense.161 
The majority in In re Christian S. found that the reference to 
an "obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating 
society"162 in the 1981 amendments clearly referred to dimin-
ished capacity and not to imperfect self-defense. l63 The court 
used the same language prior to 1981, to explain the require-
ment of malice in the operation of the diminished capacity 
defense. l64 The majority held that the language referred to 
diminished capacity, but not to imperfect self-defense.165 The 
court found "no similar reference to imperfect self-defense in 
the 1981 amendment to Penal Code section 188."166 In addi-
tion, the court stated "[w]e are not persuaded the Legislature 
would have attempted to eliminate imperfect self-defense by 
referring only to the diminished capacity defense in the 
amendment to Penal Code section 188."167 
3. Interpreting the New Malice Statute: California Penal Code 
section 188 
The majority next focused on the adverb "unlawfully" in 
the definition of express malice. 16B California Penal Code sec-
text. 
160. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 577. (citing Conley, 411 P.2d at 918., see also 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988». 
161. See supra notes 152 and 156 and accompanying text. 
162. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). See supra note 19 and accompanying 
text. 
163. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 578. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id at 579. 
168. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580. The mejority opinion also discusses implied 
malice, which was neither briefed nor argued before the court. Nevertheless, the 
majority examines the issue and determines that implied malice is inapplicable in 
cases involving imperfect self·defense. The court reasons that according to People 
v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1 (1953) implied malice under CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 
(" . . . when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances at· 
tending the killing show an abandon and malignant heart." Penal Code § 188 
requires a finding that the defendant acted with "a base, antisocial motive and 
with wanton disregard for human life .... " and did "an act that involves a high 
degree of probability that it will result in death." Thomas, 41 Cal. 2d at 480. 
Since a person who acts with an actual belief in the need for self·defense 
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tion 188 defines malice as "a deliberate intention unlawfully to 
take away the life of another.,,169 According to the majority, 
the question revolves around what "unlawfully" should modi-
fy.170 If "unlawfully" modifies the word "intention," it would 
require a subjective intent to commit an illegal act.l7l If "un-
lawfully" modifies "to take," it would make malice dependent 
on whether the act was later proven to be illegal.172 
The majority interpreted "unlawfully" to modify the 
defendant's intent. 173 Thus, the majority concluded that a 
finding of malice requires a subjective intent.174 Additionally, 
the court stated that because the statute was inherently am-
biguous, deference should be given to the defendant's interpre-
tation.175 Because the statute was reasonably susceptible to 
the defendant's interpretation, the court adopted that construc-
cannot entertain the "abandon and malignant heart" required to imply malice, the 
court concludes implied malice and imperfect self-defense are inconsistent with 
each other. 
However, in light of recent case law (Thomas was decided 41 years ago) the 
court may be able to imply malice in imperfect self-defense situations. Several 
examples of cases that may support the finding of implied malice in the present 
case are: People v. Laws, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding implied 
malice requires and intentional act, the natural consequences of which are danger-
ous to human life, deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and 
with conscious disregard for, human life), People v. Morse, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343 
(Ct. App. 1992) (holding implied malice requires an act, the natural consequences 
of which are dangerous to human life, deliberately performed by a person who 
knows that his conduct endangers the life of another who acts with conscious 
disregard for life), People v. Martinez, 281 Cal. Rptr. 205 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding 
implied malice requires a subjective awareness of life threatening risk involved in 
conduct), People v. Woods, 277 Cal. Rptr. 269 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding retaliation 
and gang violence are sufficient to provide for implied malice), and People v. 
Patterson, 778 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1989) (holding implied malice requires the physical 
component of the performance of an act, the consequences of which are dangerous 
to human life; and the mental component that the actor know that the conduct 
endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard). 
As this issue was neither briefed nor argued, it remains an open issue. It is 
far from clear whether the court will apply implied malice to imperfect self-defense 
situations in the future. 
169. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188. 
170. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580. 
175. Id. at 581 (citing to People v. Stuart, 302 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1956); People v. 
Ralph, 150 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1944); and In re Tartar, 339 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1959». 
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tion of the statute.176 
The court rejected the State's suggestion that this issue 
was decided differently in People v. Saille. 177 In Saille, the 
court stated that "[t]he verb 'unlawfully' in the express malice 
definition means simply that there is not justification, excuse, 
or mitigation for the killing recognized by law."178 The court 
next noted that Saille expressly stated that its decision had no 
bearing on imperfect self-defense.179 The majority cited to 
People v. Bobo,18o which interpreted the holding in Saille as: 
"[t]hus, in the wake of the 1981 legislation, voluntary man-
slaughter encompasses only an intentional killing resulting 
from a sudden quarrel or heat of passion (with adequate provo-
cation), and perhaps a killing arising from an honest but un-
reasonable belief in the need to defend. "lSI Based on this au-
thority, the majority concluded that "unlawfully" modified the 
actor's intent, and that the present ruling did not conflict with 
the previous ruling in Saille. 182 
The second foundation of imperfect self-defense was in the 
requirement of malice for a murder conviction.183 Pursuant to 
its new construction of the use of "unlawfully,"l84 the majori-
ty found that the requirement of an unlawful intent was incon-
sistent with imperfect self-defense.185 A defendant cannot 
have an unlawful intent and an honest but unreasonable belief 
in the need for self-defense.186 The majority thereby concludes 
that the requirement of an unlawful intent to form malice is 
176. Id. 
177. Id at 580. 
178. People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 595 (Cal. 1991). 
179. Id. at 590. 
180. People v. Bobo, 271 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1991). 
181. Bobo, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 292. The Bobo court's basis for this statement is 
somewhat uncertain. See Id. The sentence preceding the citation restates, exactly, 
the quote from SaUle as apparent final authority on the issue. Id. By simply cit-
ing to Bobo and not reviewing the Bobo rationale, the majority seems to be taking 
the word of the appellate court that there is not a conflict. See Id. The majority's 
refusal to include any reasoning behind the Bobo court's analysis seems to indicate 
that they did not understand it either. See Id. (emphasis in original). 
182. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 581. 
183. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text. 
185. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580. 
186. Id. 
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sufficient to justify the doctrine of imperfect self-defense.187 
4. Summary 
The California Supreme Court sought to determine if the 
effect of the 1981 amendments to the penal code disrupted the 
foundations of the imperfect self-defense doctrine.1ss The 
court, primarily through De Leon, found imperfect self-defense 
to have two foundational pillars: (1) the malice definition set 
forth in Conley, and (2) the requirement of malice for a murder 
conviction.189 The majority held that the amended language 
in the malice definition190 was clearly referring to diminished 
capacity and clearly not referring to imperfect self-defense.191 
The court then looked to the requirement of malice and found 
that the adverb "unlawfully" in the malice definition was in-
tended to modify the accused's intent. 192 This requirement 
was incompatible with the doctrine of imperfect self-de-
fense. 193 Thus, the majority found justification for the doc-
trine of imperfect self-defense in the unlawful intent require-
ment of malice. 194 
B. THE DISSENT 
In dissent, Chief Justice Lucas criticized the majority as 
''blinded by what it perceives to be sound public policy.,,195 
The dissent asserted instead that when the 1981 legislation 
redefined malice, the doctrinal framework for imperfect self-
defense was uprooted. 196 Chief Justice Lucas stated that the 
"sole statutory underpinning for the doctrine was a broad, now 
abrogated, definition of malice as including an awareness of 
one's proper legal obligations to society ... .'>197 Courts may 
neither create new defenses nor revive defenses which have 
been eliminated as a matter of policy or preference.198 The 
187. Id. at 583. 
188. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 577 (Cal. 1994). 
189. Id. at 579. 
190. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
191. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 578. 
192. See supra notes 168·87 and accompanying text. 
193. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 585. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 585 (Cal. 1994). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 
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dissent emphasized that the source of imperfect self-defense 
was found in Conley's malice definition which the legislature 
expressly eliminated with Senate Bill 54.199 The dissent also 
disputed the majority's conclusion concerning the definition of 
"unlawfully" as used in California Penal Code section 188.200 
Instead, the dissent asserted that the holding in Saille should 
be determinative. 201 The dissent further concluded that Flan-
nel relied on the concept of malice as defined by Conley as the 
only statutory basis of imperfect self-defense.202 As this lan-
guage has been specifically abrogated in the amendments,203 
there was no remaining statutory basis for imperfect self-de-
fense.204 
1. The Dissent's Foundation for Imperfect Self-defense 
The dissent agreed with the majority that Flannel205 was 
the birth of imperfect self-defense.206 The dissent emphasized 
Flannel's use of the malice definition in Conley207 and argued 
that imperfect self-defense, as found in Flannel, was justified 
solely on the expansive definition of malice found in Conley, 
and specifically abrogated in the 1981 amendment to the mal-
ice definition.20B The dissent also contended that imperfect 
self-defense had no significant statutory basis, and what statu-
tory basis it may have was through Conley's interpretation of 
malice.209 Imperfect self-defense, therefore, had its foundation 
in the common law definition of malice, found in Conley and 
used in Flannel to justify the doctrine as a legitimate defense 
6 (West 1988). 
199. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 585. 
200. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
201. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 590. 
202. Id. at 591. 
203. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988). 
204. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 591. 
205. People v. Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979). 
206. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 586 (Cal. 1994) (citing People v. Wells, 
202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1949), People v. Lewis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Ct. App. 1960), and 
People v. Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913 (Cal. 1974) (These cases were referred to in an 
effort to trace the development of the doctrine, but treated the concept a logical 
use of the malice statute, rather than as an actual doctrine.». 
207. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 587. See People v. Conley, 4ll P.2d 9ll, 918 
(Cal. 1966). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
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theory.21o When the legislature overruled the Conley malice 
definition, they also eliminated imperfect self-defense.211 
2. The Majority's Use of "Unlawfully" 
The majority used the single word "unlawfully" in the 
definition of malice212 to find a statutory basis for imperfect 
self-defense.213 The dissent found this unacceptable for sever-
al reasons. First, neither Flannel nor any other case involving 
imperfect self-defense had ever placed any reliance on "unlaw-
fully."214 Second, it would be illogical to allow a doctrine en-
tirely hidden within the statutory definition of express malice, 
to control the outcome of implied malice cases.215 Third, the 
word "unlawfully" had already been defined in Saille216 to 
mean precisely the opposite of what the majority contended it 
meant in In re Christian S.2l7 To hold that "unlawfully" modi-
fies the act of murder itself in every situation except when a 
defendant claims imperfect self-defense, where "unlawfully" 
modifies intent, is illogical and cumbersome as a practical 
rule.218 Fourth, the majority's construction would allow a 
defendant to mitigate a murder conviction based on an unrea-
sonable mistake of fact, while all other cases require a mistake 
of fact to be both honest and reasonable.219 As a final point, 
the dissent stated that construing "unlawfully" to modify in-
tent would directly conflict with the amended language in the 
statute220 which stated that awareness of legal or societal ob-
ligations, or the illegality or wrongfulness of one's actions, are 
no longer relevant.221 
210. [d. at 591. 
211. [d. 
212. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188. 
213. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 590. 
214. [d. 
215. [d. 
216. People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 594 (Cal. 1991). 
217. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 590. 
218. [d. at 589. 
219. [d. 
220. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188. 
221. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 590. 
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V. CRITIQUE 
A. "UNLAWFULLY" HAS BEEN MISCONSTRUED 
The majority contended that the adverb "unlawfully" in 
the amended definition of express malice modified the word 
"intention" and not "to take."222 Under the In re Christian S. 
majority's construction, the statute required the defendant 
have an intention to act unlawfully, or, put more simply, a 
wrongful intent.223 The survival of imperfect self-defense is 
justified entirely on this holding.224 A number of problems 
arise from this construction of "unlawfully." 
1. Implied Malice 
A doctrine found to be supported entirely by a single word 
in the definition of express malice can not reasonably be found 
to control implied malice situations.225 The definition of im-
plied malice states that malice should be implied "when no 
considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances 
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant 
heart."226 The implied malice definition does not involve any 
consideration of express malice, an "unlawful intention," or "an 
awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of 
laws regulating society."227 Because of this, implied malice is 
unaffected by any of the reasoning the majority uses to justify 
imperfect self-defense under the express malice statute.228 
The majority contended that an unreasonable but actual 
belief in the necessity of the use of deadly force in self-defense 
is incompatible with the "abandon and malignant heart" re-
quirement of implied malice.229 As support, the majority cited 
to People v. Wells. 230 In Wells, a prisoner serving a life sen-
tence attacked a prison guard,231 and was charged under Pe-
222. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 580 (Cal. 1994). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 
188 (West 1988); see also supra note 19. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 590. 
225. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 590. 
226. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188. 
227. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580. 
228. See id. 
229. Id. at 581. 
230. 202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1949). 
231. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 581. 
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nal Code section 4500 with assault by a life prisoner "with 
malice aforethought."232 The Wells holding has nothing to do 
with implied malice because the mens rea element of Penal 
Code section 4500 is express malice.233 The dissent correctly 
stated that "no case has ever interpreted ["an abandon and 
malignant heart"] as incorporating the imperfect self-defense 
doctrine as a defense to implied malice murder."234 
The majority noted correctly that if the requirement of an 
abandon and malignant heart did not support imperfect self-
defense, imperfect self-defense would apply to express malice 
but not implied malice situations.235 Thus, a defendant would 
be guilty of manslaughter if she acted with the intent to kill 
her perceived assailant, but would be guilty of murder if she 
only intended to seriously injure.236 Nevertheless, the eager-
ness with which the majority reached this conclusion is ques-
tionable, as the issue of implied malice was neither briefed nor 
argued before the court at any point.237 
2. "Unlawfully" According to Saille 
In People v. Saille,238 the California Supreme Court 
found the adverb "unlawfully" in the express malice definition 
meant simply that "there is no justification, excuse, or mitiga-
tion for the killing, recognized by the law.,,239 This is the re-
sult of "unlawfully" modifying "to take," in contradiction to the 
In re Christian S. mf\jority holding that "unlawfully" modifies 
"intention. ,,240 In disregarding this precedent, the majority 
pointed out that the Saille court had stated "[imperfect self-
defense] has no application to the facts before us, and we do 
not decide whether it has been affected by ... the 1981legisla-
tion.,,241 However, the Saille court's holding concerning the 
construction of "unlawfully" was not dependent on the effect of 
232. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188. 
233. See Christian S., 872 P.2d at 690. 
234. [d. 
236. [d. at 681. 
236. [d. This illustration is used by the majority. 
237. [d. at 690. 
238. 820 P.2d 688 (Cal. 1992) 
239. [d. at 696. 
240. See Christian S., 872 P.2d at 680. 
241. [d. 
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the 1981legislation.242 
Instead, the Sailie Court based its analysis on prior case 
law, specifically People v. Wells 243 and People v. Gorshen. 244 
The court in Saille concluded from this precedent that "the 
concept of malice aforethought was manifested by the doing of 
an unlawful and felonious act intentionally and without legal 
cause or excuse."245 The phrasing that the majority cites as 
the holding in Saille, "no justification excuse or mitigation for 
the killing recognized by the law," is borrowed from a prior 
holding.246 In People v. Stress, 247 the court found malice 
based on the fact that "[t]here was no justification, excuse or 
mitigation for the killing offered by appellant that is recog-
nized by law."24s Thus, the construction of "unlawfully" modi-
fying "to act" was not the result of an analysis of the effect of 
the 1981legislation.249 
The Saille holding concerning the construction of "unlaw-
fully" should control because the holding concerning the con-
struction of "unlawfully" has clear precedent in Stress.250 
Moreover, the holding in Stress was unaffected by the Saille 
court's refusal to extend their construction of "unlawfully" to 
imperfect self-defense. 251 Even if the majority found that 
somehow Saille's construction was dependent on a review and 
application of the 1981 legislation, the application of "unlaw-
fully" in Stress clearly contradicts the In re Christian S. 
majority's construction of "unlawfully."252 
242. See Saille, 820 P.2d at 595. 
243. 202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1949) (holding malice aforethought denotes purpose and 
design as opposed to accident and chance). 
244. 336 P.2d 492 (Cal. 1959) (holding malice specifically related to homicide 
and that malice aforethought involves purpose, motive and/or intent). 
245. Saille, 820 P.2d at 595. 
246. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580. 
247. 252 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Ct. App. 1988). 
248. Stress, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 918. 
249. See Saille, 820 P.2d at 595. 
250. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 590. See Stress, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 918. 
251. Stress, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 918. 
252. See Stress, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 918. 
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3. Contradiction of Express Statement 
The majority, by interpreting "unlawfully" to modify "in-
tention,"253 finds that the definition of malice includes "a 
threshold subjective awareness of the illegality or wrongfulness 
of one's conduct."254 The majority's construction of "unlawful-
ly" thus required a consideration of the defendant's mental 
state when determining if that defendant harbored malice.255 
The creation of this threshold mental requirement directly 
contradicts the amended language in the express malice defini-
tion and the legislative intent.256 The purpose of the 1981 
amendments was to refuse to allow defendants to mitigate 
their criminality through mental state defenses which prove 
they could not have acted with malice.257 The Christian S. 
majority's holding now requires the court to examine the 
defendant's mental state to determine if the defendant har-
bored malice, which is precisely what the legislature sought to 
eliminate in 1981.258 The majority's construction is in contra-
diction to legislative intent and the amended language in the 
malice definition, and therefore makes the malice definition 
self-contradictory.259 
B. THE CREATION OF AN UNREASONABLE MISTAKE OF FACT 
The majority in In re Christian S. concedes that it is cre-
ating a defense based on an unreasonable mistake of fact.2GO 
The majority is quick to point out, however, that this unrea-
sonable mistake of fact defense is limited to the context of a 
claim of imperfect self-defense.261 The court went on to point 
out "[w]e do not suggest that an unreasonable mistake of fact 
would be a defense under Penal Code section 26."262 
253. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 580 (Cal. 1994). 
254. Id. at 590. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 590. 
259. Id. 
260. In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 580 n.S (Cal. 1994). The mistake of fact 
at issue in these situations is in the justification for the need for the use of dead-
ly force, i.e., if the victim unreasonably appeared to have a weapon. 
261. Id. 
262. 1d. 
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The creation of a defense based on an unreasonable mis-
take of fact is unprecedented and expressly contradictory to 
established case law.263 "At common law an honest and rea-
sonable belief in the existence of circumstances, which, if true, 
would make the act for which the person is indicted an inno-
cent act, has always been held to be a good defense. »264 Prior 
to In re Christian S., California courts had never held that an 
unreasonable mistake of fact was a good defense in any area of 
the law.265 Courts are prohibited from creating new, non-stat-
utory defenses.266 Yet, the majority in In re Christian S. had 
created a defense based on an unreasonable mistake of fact, 
without any common law or statutory support.267 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The majority's holding in In re Christian S., that imperfect 
self-defense remains a viable doctrine, is flawed. The problems 
that arise when attempting to justify the doctrine under exist-
ing statutes indicate that the doctrine is no longer firmly 
grounded. The majority seems to be attempting to fill an in-
creasing need for leniency in certain homicide situations~ The 
majority, however, should have waited for action from the 
legislature,268 rather than revive a doctrine which should 
have been abrogated fourteen years ago. Imperfect self-de-
fense has survived the 1981 amendments, but its victory may 
be costly and ultimately self-defeating. It remains to be seen 
whether imperfect self-defense will fill the need the majority 
seems to be targeting. Due to the flaws inherent in the doc-
263. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 590. 
264. People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850, 855 (Cal. 1956) (citing Regina v. Tolson, 
L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889)). 
265. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 580. Landmark cases in the development of a 
legal mistake of fact are People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961, 965 (Cal. 1992), People 
v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975), People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. 
1964), and Vogel, 299 P.2d at 853. 
266. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (West 1988). 
267. Christian S., 872 P.2d at 590. 
268. Two bills were introduced to the California legislature in March of 1993, 
Senate Bill 1144 and Assembly Bill 947 (AB 947, Reg. Sess. (1993-94» each of 
which attempted to codify imperfect self-defense. Senate Bill 1144 failed in Sep-
tember of 1993 (SB 1144, Reg. Sess. (1993-94». Assembly Bill 974 failed in August 
of 1994 (AB 947, Reg. Sess. (1993-94». 
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trine itself, the future usefulness of the imperfect self-defense 
doctrine is questionable at best. 
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